Организация повстанцев полный вариант (English)

ORGANIZING REBELS IN AN INSURRECTION WAR

         Contemporary Humanitarian Studies, issue 3 for 2015, pp. 1 53-168.

         Pashkov R.V., MSLA specialist

1. TYPES OF RESISTANCE.

It’s important to understand that there are very few types of resistance, and they are differentiated by two criteria: ideology and structure. Ideologically, resistance can be communist, nationalist (separatist), and Islamic (Islamist). Sometimes, there is communist-nationalist and national-Islamist (not communist-Islamist). Structure can be military-political, military-state, or military-political-state, based on the presence of military units, statehood, and a political liberation organization.

         For example,

Communist military-political-state — Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia of the Communist Party of Colombia of the Socialist Bolivarian Republic of Colombia,

National-Islamist military-political-state — Islamic Armed Forces of Bangasamoro of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front of the Islamic Republic of Bangasamoro (Philippines),

National-Islamist military-state — Armed Forces of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria,

National military-political — Sudan People’s Liberation Army of the Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement,

Islamic military-political — Islamic Resistance Forces of Lebanon Hezbollah,

Communist-nationalist military-state — Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Sri Lanka) of the state of Tamil Eelam,

National military-state — Kosovo Liberation Army (Serbia) of the independent Republic of Kosovo,

Islamist military-state – Islamic Armed Forces of the Islamic Emirate of the Caucasus,

Islamist military-political-state — Islamic Army of Aden-Abyan of the Islamic Emirate of Abyan (Yemen) of «Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula»,

Communist military-political — New People’s Army of the Communist Party of Mao Zedong Thought of the Philippines,

National military-political-state — Puntland Defense Forces of the Republic of Puntland of the Democratic Salvation Front of Somalia.

The most developed theory of people’s insurgent war is Maoism, the theory of the second stage of Marxism-Leninism. According to Maoism, contradictions give rise to two types of war: a just progressive war and a reactionary war between imperialists for the redivision of the world. A just progressive war is a revolutionary people’s war and proceeds in two stages: a national war for liberation from imperialism, which results in the emergence of a people’s democratic republic; and the second stage is a socialist civil war between classes, which ultimately results in the birth of a socialist state. The concept of organizing Maoist political forces presupposes the creation of a National Democratic Front, the core of which is the Communist Party. This Front forms a people’s government, a people’s liberation army, and local councils with a party core.

Classes in Maoist War:

1. The peasantry is the main support force. The army relies on the support of the masses,
2. The proletariat is the most advanced and revolutionary class, acting in alliance with the peasantry,
3. The urban petty bourgeoisie—this class can be transformed and relied upon. The national bourgeoisie is an ally in the democratic revolution, an adversary in the socialist one. The petty bourgeoisie is hesitant; it must be led.
4. The imperialists and the comprador bourgeoisie are unconditional enemies even in the first democratic revolution,
5. The question of the middle national bourgeoisie is complex. It may support a democratic revolution, but it is an absolute opponent during a socialist one.
6. The intelligentsia is not a class; it is the most conscious representatives of the workers and the petty urban bourgeoisie.

The People’s Liberation Army is an armed organization that carries out the political tasks of the revolution (M. Zedong). The army’s tasks are to fight, to work, and to propagandize. The army requires the institution of commissars and political departments. The areas of political control in such an army are class affiliation, ideological state, and military command. The basic requirements of party discipline are: the subordination of party members to the party organization, the subordination of minorities to the majority, the subordination of lower authorities to higher ones, and the subordination of the entire party to the Central Committee.

         Mao Zedong divided successful guerrilla warfare into three stages. The first stage is the creation of a guerrilla base. Or, in Mao’s own terms, «the village rises up against the city.» The first stage of guerrilla warfare involves establishing a guerrilla base or focal point (called a «foco» in Latin American practice) in a remote, inaccessible, uncontrolled (or poorly controlled by the authorities) mountainous or forested region. The guerrilla focal point represents a microchip of future people’s power. Here, everything is subordinated to the movement’s outward expansion. At the same time, massive propaganda is conducted in the most accessible forms. Propaganda asserted: this is not an attempt to create an ideal system, a «kingdom of God on earth.» All the administrative and social changes being implemented in the focal point are not a blueprint for what will happen after universal victory; all of this is being done solely to ensure our guerrilla movement survives and wins. And after victory, everything will be organized completely differently. Much better.

         Mao described the second stage of guerrilla warfare as «the countryside encircles the city.» At this stage, guerrilla operations extend beyond the guerrilla base and create guerrilla zones. Guerrilla zones shouldn’t be thought of as areas completely controlled by the guerrillas, areas where a new people’s government has been established. They are simply areas where the guerrillas conduct their combat operations. They haven’t yet captured this territory; they continue to operate using guerrilla methods, but they constantly conduct campaigns, raids, and forays within these areas. The goal of the second stage is to wear down the enemy’s forces and create an atmosphere of uncertainty and instability.

         the third stage of guerrilla warfare «the village takes the city.» By the time the authorities begin to exhaust themselves in the endless struggle against the guerrillas, they attempt to concentrate all their forces in large cities, strategic centers, and key military bases. The enemy completely loses the strategic initiative.

         In its general political orientation, Castroism, as a product of the ideology of the Latin American intelligentsia, is characterized primarily by what can be defined as «voluntarism» or «subjectivism.» The will of individual, determined revolutionaries or small groups of them is more important than the actual state of affairs; the actions of the revolutionary subject matter more than the objective situation; revolutionary activity is more important than the most complete theory.

         As for so-called metapolitical notions, three elements are found within them: first, an anti-imperialist nationalism that gravitates not toward Marx but toward the apostle of Cuban freedom , José Martí; second, the «caudillismo» so typical of Latin America, a concept that can only very loosely be described as the «principle of leaderism.» Finally, among the factors termed «metapolitical» is an ideology that can be defined as either totalitarian or heroic humanism. From the democratic humanism of those days, oriented toward satisfying the needs of man as he was, over time a completely different humanism was born —a humanism aimed at fundamentally altering human nature—including through coercion, suppressing any manifestation of individualism, any desire for material goods, and creating a new—collective and heroic—man of totalitarian democracy. This re-education of man is the task and duty of the vanguard, and it can only be accomplished by constant pressure on the masses.

         Now let’s move on to the strategy and tactics of Castroism, which were called guerrillaism. It emerged only in the years following the victory of the Cuban Revolution, and it can be summarized in three theses, the first two of which are already contained in 1960 гa small brochure by Guevara published in [the original text]: «It is not always necessary to wait for all the conditions for a revolution to be ripe: the insurgent center can create them itself.» It should be noted that by «insurgent center» Guevara means a small guerrilla group. The second thesis is formulated as follows: «In the underdeveloped countries of the American continent, armed struggle must be waged primarily in the countryside.» Here, the countryside is clearly contrasted with the city. These two theses are complemented by a third, which states: «A guerrilla group fighting in the mountains and jungles, and not a party based in the city, forms the military-political vanguard of a potentially socialist, anti-imperialist, and anti-oligarchic revolution.»

         It would be wrong to assume that Castroists view the countryside as the decisive theater of military operations , primarily because they consider themselves agrarian revolutionaries. There are three reasons why Castroists consider the countryside—as opposed to the city—the decisive factor. First and foremost are geopolitical and geographical considerations. Geopolitically, this thesis is based on the fact that enemy power is concentrated in the cities, while the rural areas, located far from urban centers, largely underdeveloped and often difficult to access, can only be adequately controlled by the police and army. Secondly, there are, so to speak, «pedagogical» reasons. Only in the harsh conditions of prolonged struggle in the jungles and mountains, where all urban comforts are completely absent, can the character of a revolutionary be forged. In third place, the reason that is always given is the fact that in most Latin American countries the rural population is numerically dominant and at the same time it is precisely this population that languishes in the greatest poverty, and therefore also remains to a particularly high degree potentially revolutionary.

         The traditional Communist Party, gravitating toward the city and based in the city, with its participation in electoral and trade union struggles, and its union policy toward bourgeois strata of the population and organizations, is seen by Castroites, despite any theoretical qualifications its cadres may possess, as an unsuitable instrument of revolution. The main thing that establishes the partisans as a revolutionary vanguard is not their experience or theoretical proficiency, or even ideological purity, but their willingness to struggle and make sacrifices.

         Among Islamism, the most developed insurgency strategy is that of Wahhabism. The Wahhabist strategy is based on the gradual seizure of territory, simultaneously seizing small parts in various locations. Small countries are captured entirely, while larger ones are captured piecemeal, through separatist movements. The capture of each part is planned in stages.

         Wahhabi recruiters appear in a country or region. They don’t conduct propaganda, they simply observe. They provide unconditional financial assistance, especially to Islamic organizations, and select promising candidates for leadership roles in local associations (jamaats). They introduce them to their teachings. Prospective leaders —future emirs— are usually openly invited to join the Wahhabis during the Hajj in Mecca (or Christians during a foreign visit). It is believed that after preliminary preparation and demonstration of enormous material benefits, the candidate will be unable to refuse.

         Future emirs are attempting to secure prominent positions in the traditional religious structures of the area. Open propaganda is not yet being conducted; the emphasis is on cultivating a broad circle of supporters through financial subsidies for medical treatment, secular education abroad, and the like. A small community —a jamaat—is being formed. Members of the new jamaat undergo training courses at Wahhabi camps abroad. The emirs are beginning to preach Wahhabism on a broader scale.

         In the location of a jamaat, a separatist (or, in smaller countries, opposition) movement flares up based on traditional structures . The jamaat supports the rebels, becoming their most combat-ready military unit. Military successes attract young people, the jamaat expands, opens basic training camps, and the number of those completing full courses of study abroad increases. Everything is done to escalate the military conflict to the greatest possible extent. Refugee flows and, in general, any significant movement of people are encouraged by all available means. The crisis leads to the weakening of traditional structures and the strengthening of jamaats. Training camps are established locally for basic training. Real power shifts to the shura (council) of emirs of all the main jamaats in a given region. At this stage, traditional structures are preferred to be preserved to legitimize Sharia law in the eyes of the population and the outside world.

         If government forces disintegrate or become demoralized, they are quickly liquidated, along with the traditional structures that underpinned separatism (the opposition), with the destruction of these structures attributed to the authorities. If a quick victory over government forces is impossible, a protracted guerrilla war is waged, with the same result. All forces are mobilized to spread Wahhabism to neighboring territories.

Wahhabism is not an independent legal school (madhhab) or movement; it is an ideology based on the works of its founder, Muhammad Abd al-Wahhab, in particular his «Book of Monotheism,» which has also been published in Russian. Muhammad Abd al-Wahhab’s teachings arose on the Arabian Peninsula during a period when, alongside Islam, pre-Islamic pagan beliefs and cults were widespread, and his followers relentlessly fought them. Muhammad Abd al-Wahhab’s followers, calling themselves «monotheists» or simply «Muslims,» never called themselves «Wahhabis.»

After the period of state-building in the Arabian Peninsula, the teachings of Muhammad Abd al-Wahhab lost their revolutionary character, becoming a component of local history and tradition, and its author is viewed as a religious and social figure who contributed to the formation of the state. In the absence of socio-economic and state-political conditions, religious and ideological means were chosen as the means of centralizing Arabia. In Saudi Arabia and several neighboring countries, the usual Muslim order was established, based on adherence to one of four equally valid, generally accepted Sunni schools, in this case, Hanbali. Compared to the communist worldview, Islamic fundamentalism is communism in general, Wahhabism is the communism of the Soviet Union, and neo-Wahhabism is Gevarism as a strategy for the subjective acceleration of revolution and armed guerrilla warfare that creates a state.

2. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE INSURANCE WAR.

The counterinsurgency is in power, while the rebels, deprived of it, have few or no such advantages. In the realm of intangible factors, however, the rebels have a tremendous advantage—the strength of their ideas, which guide their actions. During the course of a war, the resistance is forced to expand its base and increase its strength; otherwise, the uprising or revolutionary war will collapse. If the rebels succeed in separating the population from the counterinsurgency, they will win the war. Politics becomes an active instrument of military operations, which are always subordinated to it in any military operation.

The rebels are not interested in launching an attack until they feel they can withstand the enemy’s expected retaliatory strike. The protracted nature of the uprising is dictated by the rebels’ initial weakness. Since the government is still responsible for maintaining public order, its costs compared to those of the rebels can be 10-20 times greater, and there are more to come.

          Insurgents are inherently mobile because they lack any accountability or material assets. Until a balance of power is achieved, this advantage remains, despite the fact that only counterinsurgent forces can draw on significant available material resources. The resistance, lacking accountability, can resort to any trick. It is not obligated to provide evidence, whereas a government is judged by its actions, not the program it puts forward.

         The ideal situation for the rebels would be a country surrounded on all sides by other states, with a vast, blunt-star-shaped territory, with jungle-covered mountains along the borders and swamps scattered across the plains, located in the temperate zone, with a large and dispersed rural population and a primitive economy.

         From the counter-insurgency point of view, a state located on a small island, shaped like a pointed star, with several cities evenly distributed over its territory and separated from each other by a desert, with a tropical or arctic climate and a developed industry, is preferable.

    Features of the revolutionary liberation struggle:

1. A revolutionary liberation war is waged with the goal of gaining political control within the state. One or both sides may receive covert or overt assistance from foreign states, but at its core, a revolutionary liberation war is a political war.
2. A revolutionary liberation war is a total war. To wage it, the entire people are mobilized and all means are used.
3. To wage this war, all forces are used as a unified whole. This involves the use of all means of influence by a small group of leaders whose experience includes not only military theory but also political science, psychology, and diplomacy.
4. To wage war successfully, it is important to focus on misleading the enemy.
5. A revolutionary war of liberation is a protracted one. Time is a revolutionary’s ally, as it helps build a political foundation and increase military might. A protracted war weakens the enemy’s will, creating the perception of its endlessness and futility.
6. A revolutionary liberation war is a changing war. By nature, it typically begins as a purely political undertaking, accompanied by guerrilla warfare. Armed struggle then gains increasing importance, and eventually, guerrilla forces become regular forces, establishing a balance between the political and military components. In the final stage, political struggle plays a minor role, with combined arms operations taking place.

A movement, or a higher organization, a party, usually emerges from some social organization with greater authority. In this initial stage, the insurgents’ vulnerability depends on the tolerance shown by the counterinsurgency. This tolerance stems from the counterinsurgency’s typically inability to assess the threat or its repression of everyone, which is ineffective.

A coalition of forces could legally attempt to win the elections, and then the issue would be resolved through a tug-of-war within government bodies, that is, a gradual recapture of positions. A brutal crackdown on the opposition’s organizational structures would then be possible, in the course of a classic military coup. The opposition would have no chance of immediately destroying its opponents due to the slow consolidation of its positions and the lack of an immediate armed force.

         In the second scenario, the government unleashes a political and information war against the opposition in civil society, attempting to neutralize it by weakening its influence in social institutions outside the state. Here, too, a percussive coup is possible, with the opposition disappearing during the government’s political campaign, or a transition to the second stage of guerrilla warfare.

         In the second stage, the resistance shifts to guerrilla warfare, when their vulnerability is at its greatest: their military might is still negligible or nonexistent, and their leadership is located close to the future armed core. However, the rebels are inactive, and their military core has been tested by years of fighting. There is no need to expand the struggle , and therefore, there are no information leaks. The main thing is not to act prematurely.

         In the third stage, the rebels’ military strategy involves creating a regular army. Until this is established, the rebels’ vulnerability increases, as their units are common targets. However, once the armed forces are established, the resistance is difficult to defeat with a single, lightning-fast operation. A protracted struggle awaits, with the government using all available means, and success is ultimately uncertain even at the end of such a struggle.

         A regular army is the armed force of a state, with specific organizational forms, a defined command and control system, established discipline, and a general order of combat operations. The characteristic characteristics of an army in a combat situation are: plannedness, consistency, and ideological unification of actions, with the intended creation of the most favorable conditions for their implementation. Constant contact with the enemy should be considered an essential characteristic of combat operations by a regular army. Guerrillas, on the other hand, track the enemy’s every move and take advantage of every opportunity to inflict damage, revealing themselves only at the moment of attack.

         Partisans have their own command staff, usually elected, to govern. However, an elected commander appoints his own assistants at his own discretion. In terms of discipline, each partisan maintains his own individuality. The lack of constant combat contact with the enemy is the main difference between partisans and regular armies. This explains the frequency of partisan operations. Partisans fight when the enemy’s resistance is weakest.

         The reasons why a partisan detachment is inferior to units of the regular government army are: heterogeneity of the detachment’s composition, inability to carry out methodical actions, comparative weakness of technical means, dependence on available ammunition, sensitivity to losses, weak combat discipline, the habit of individual units of the detachment to leave the battle, the lack of systematic management of operations, discord among military leaders.

         Guerrilla units are armed groups of the local population or corresponding military units separated from the army, who have set themselves the goal (and received such a task) of exterminating the enemy by attacking at the moments of his least ability to resist, and who in other cases do not commit themselves to constant armed clashes with the enemy.

         The maximum usefulness of partisan work and the extent of their influence on the course of their army’s operations are determined by the presence of operational communications and the systematic nature of these actions. The scope of partisan operations (in addition to their personal qualities) depends on the degree of enemy troop saturation in the area, the terrain, and, most importantly, the attitude of the local population.

         Characteristic features of an insurgent war (guerrilla or guerrilla): a unique concept of the enemy, which includes both his troops and his institutions, authorities at various levels, the dominant political organizations of the enemy, various organizations of collaborators and their paramilitary formations, etc., the achievement of combat goals with limited forces and means against a regular army of the enemy, superior to the guerrillas in all respects (except, perhaps, fighting spirit), a variety of objects against which guerrilla attacks are carried out, the absence of a front line and actions of guerrillas on the territory controlled by the enemy, the absence of a specific uniform for guerrillas (usually only stripes), preferential attacks on selective objects, separated territorially, but united by their importance, irregular combat food supplies for guerrilla forces, widespread use of local resources by various types of guerrillas, great difficulties with the transportation and treatment of the sick and wounded, an objective need, along with combat operations against the enemy, to improve contacts with the population, to carry out social activities.

3. REBEL FORCES INFRASTRUCTURE.

         Let’s start with budgeting. Rebels typically refer to their racketeering as a revolutionary tax or a jihad tax, like the Islamists. In exchange for patronage and promises to «leave them alone,» entrepreneurs are forced to pay a significant portion of their income in a situation where the official government cannot protect them from such racketeering. Quite often, a significant portion of the rebels’ income comes from ransoms for kidnappings or drug trafficking.

Furthermore, the Supreme, General, or Central Command includes the Supreme Headquarters, the General Staff, and the headquarters security forces (force protection). The General Staff of the Kosovo Liberation Army included eight directorates (political, operational, intelligence, logistics and supply, finance, civil administration and order, personnel, and communications) and several separate services (legal, medical, social services, security, and the office of the chief surgeon). In any rebel General Staff, the operational department and political department are particularly important. In the New People’s Army of the Philippines, the Political Department of the General Staff oversees the political directorates of the fronts.

         Departments of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria: operations, logistics, communications, armaments, supplies, and intelligence. Departments of the General Staff of the People’s Liberation Forces of Mozambique (People’s Liberation Front for Mozambique): mobilization, military intelligence, communications, military press and information, political commissariat, and counterintelligence. Departments of the General Staff of the Revolutionary Liberation Army of Yemen (Front for the Liberation of the Occupied South of Yemen): propaganda, political, military, security, and financial. Departments of the General Staff of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists): operations, intelligence, personnel, propaganda, and logistics.

         Paramilitary formations typically come in two forms: Military Police (typical of national resistance and, to a lesser extent, Islamist resistance), such as the Kosovo Liberation Army (usually a Western-oriented organization), the Sharia Guard of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (later the Islamic Emirate of the Caucasus), special battalions of the Security Police of the Polish Republic, the Gendarmerie of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, or militia support units (mostly communist and largely Islamist), such as the Bolivarian Militia of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, the People’s Militia of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Mozambique, the Islamic militia of the Lebanese Shiite movement Hezbollah, and the civilian militia of the Tamil Eelama state. The latter formations are more typical of independent movements.

It is necessary to mention the training system. Usually it is either

• Military Academy like the Kosovo Liberation Army or the Institute for the Study of Revolutionary War of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army, or the Military-Political Academy of the Kurdistan Liberation Army
• either sergeant or senior sergeant schools for commanders or training schools for junior command personnel, as in the Ukrainian Insurgent Army or the Lithuanian Liberation Army
• or training centers such as the Islamist training center «Caucasus».

         services are usually established as independent structures, such as the Security Service of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, the National Security Service of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, and the Kosovo Information Service. Islamist militant groups typically establish a Mukhabarat—a special internal security service. It should be noted that intelligence is rarely established as a separate service among rebels; it is typically part of the internal security special service.

         Political work is crucial for the rebels. Every unit has a commissar who heads political work, and in larger units, a political department is formed. Commissars are sometimes granted the authority to overrule a unit commander’s order. There were many cases where even when the rebels suffered defeat in a larger battle, all forces were not deployed because not all rebel units had undergone political indoctrination, and there was a risk that the units would simply disintegrate on the battlefield. Within the Front Executive Committee and at the level of the rebel headquarters, political directorates and departments were necessarily established, with the commissars reporting directly from the bottom up to the commanders.

For every 100 guerrillas, there is one political commissar, two to three security officers, and three to four military police officers. Of particular importance in the rebel security services are the counterintelligence department, the military intelligence department, and the special operations department (the elimination of enemy commanders and officials). The structure of Hezbollah’s Special Security Apparatus includes the National Security Service (intelligence in Lebanon), the Preventive Security Service (physical security), the Internal Security Service (counterintelligence), the External Security Service (intelligence outside Lebanon), the Special Operations Forces Department, the Psychological Operations Department, the Coordination Department (with allied organizations), and separate departments for relations with Syria, Iran, and so on.

Types of branches of troops in rebel armed forces:

1. regular units (or militia):
2. The main regular strike units, or Main Forces, are the backbone of the army, fighting on a permanent basis. These units are permanently stationed at military bases or fortified camps.
3. Reserve of the General Command,
4. Or militia formations in the form of local rebel detachments, the question is that if, as in the Afghan Taliban, the detachments consist of members of a local cell and are permanently based in one village or another, can such formations be considered regular or more like militia units that need to be distinguished from the law enforcement forces of the militants?
5. The militia forces of law and order or the local police of the militants,
6. Special sabotage forces — special forces of the militants, this is what is usually called the urban front, that is, the forces of urban guerrilla warfare, usually consisting of a brigade in the city, including autonomous special combat groups,
7. The underground network of sympathizers is what is called the classic underground,
8. Sometimes Naval Forces are formed, such as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam of Sri Lanka.

For example, the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) of the Sri Lankan Tamil community includes regular formations (up to 4,500 soldiers), Special Forces (up to 2,000 soldiers), Naval Forces (up to 4,000), and the Eelam Civil Militia (up to 15,000). The armed forces of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria numbered 9,000 fighters, the Special Sabotage Forces (700 soldiers) organized into special operational groups, irregular militia forces (being transformed into the Sharia Guard) numbering 13,000, plus an underground force of 25,000.

An armed formation is a large paramilitary unit led by an authoritative political or military leader, created to forcibly protect the interests of a specific financial, economic, and political (religious) group. During the Islamist invasion of Dagestan (a southern region of Russia) from the separatist Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (Cherkessia), the armed formation consisted of a commander, a headquarters, and two groups (each with up to 500 members during the fighting). In total, there were three units and six groups.

The groups are further subdivided into a combat force, intended to directly conduct the operation in the designated area, and a reserve force, designed to bolster efforts and perform scheduled (usually weekly) replacements of active militants. The group is divided into five to six detachments (100 or more men each), led by emirs (field commanders).

The detachment, as a rule, consisted of three groups.

The first is the central group (up to 100 people), which is constantly with the emir in combat readiness and does not have a permanent location.

The second group (the size of which depends on the size of the territory and can be up to 20 people) is located in the populated area. This group reports to, is controlled by, and communicates only with the emir. Members of the group have been trained at a special training center and specialize in mine planting, sniper shooting, and sabotage and reconnaissance activities. The militants of the second group are deeply undercover and engage in legal public activities.

The third group is the «helpers.» These are the amir’s associates and supporters, living at home. To save money, this group does not remain with the detachment permanently. When ordered by the amir, they report to him and carry out the task, then return home and resume their normal activities, or act independently with the amir’s consent.

Thus, the central group is the detachment’s core formation and consists of three platoons of three squads each. The group is armed only with light-weight weapons, as it is constantly on the move, attacking and retreating. The time, location, and target of the attack are determined by the emir.

         Types of guerrilla warfare include sabotage by reconnaissance and sabotage groups of 5-25 men, insurgent-style guerrilla warfare, and military-style guerrilla warfare—under army command in occupied territories. Rebel units are small in number, but their combat capabilities are excellent. The larger the number of troops, the more difficult command and control becomes, the greater the expense, and the greater the vulnerability. The counterinsurgency is forced to: the larger the area of resistance, the greater the number of militia forces deployed. This ratio ranges from 1:2 to 1:25.

     The rebels are stubbornly supported by the population of certain areas of the country. These are the rebel bases, their most reliable strongholds. They are difficult to capture when the intransigent opposition is on the offensive. But as soon as the strategic initiative is seized, a slow compression or lightning-fast special forces operations begin. Funding 6,000-10,000 rebels requires $2-10 million monthly, depending on the scale and scope of the planned and ongoing operations. The counterinsurgency is sometimes forced to spend up to 50% of the country’s entire budget on countering them.

         The rebels’ territorial organization includes the regional level—a group of fronts—the front, then the front, then the sector—the operational zone—the district, and finally the locality. At each level, a corresponding command and headquarters with support structures are formed.

Let’s give some examples:

1. Kosovo Liberation Army – General Staff – 7 operational zones – 5 brigades in each operational zone – then detachments

As of spring 1999, the following operational zones/brigades were recorded: 1 OZ (111th, 112th, 113th, 114th brigades); 2 OZ (121st, 122nd, 123rd brigades); 3 OZ (131st, 132nd, 133rd, 134th brigades); 4 OZ (141st, 142nd, 143rd brigades); 5 OZ (151st, 152nd, 153rd brigades); 6 OZ (161st, 162nd brigades); 7 OZ (171st brigade). 

• Armed Forces of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria – General Staff – 9 fronts – each front has a sector – a brigade and jamaat in the sector
• Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – General Staff – Front Group 7-9 – Front 45-47 – Column (2 Formations) – Formation and Detachment
• New People’s Army of the Communist Party of the Philippines — General Staff — Region — Front (13 in total) — District — Sector — Detachment

The identified formations are the Larangan detachment . 77 (Legazpi, Luzon Island); 6th Front Committee (Bukidong Province), Melito Command Glor (Southern Tagalong); Josefino Corpus Command (Tarlac — Luzon); Merardo Arce Command; Detachment 51 (North Cotabato); Sandatahang Propaganda Unit 1 (Eastern Cagayan); Northern Luzon Commission; Southern Mindanao Commission; Manila-Rizal Regional Committee (Alex Boyancayo Brigade). 

• Sudan People’s Liberation Army — General Staff — 3 sectors — division — brigade (3-7 in a division) — battalion — company and then platoon

The headquarters /main command post of the Armed Forces is the city of Bulak (Ethiopia); subordinate command bodies ­are the headquarters of the Northern, Eastern, and Southern sectors. The organizational structure is based on the principles of the regular army: squad (17 people) — platoon (51 people) — company (224 people) — battalion (1,344 people) — brigade (variable composition) — division (up to 15,000 people). The identified formations are divisions ( Jarad , Mour Mour , Kazuk , Zalzal , Intfadha , Intisar ). There are up to 40 combat battalions, including Buffalo , Tiger , Crocodile , Oil , Zindiya , Cobra , Rhod , Lion , Elephant , Rhino , Hippo , and the 13th Battalion (each unit operates in an assigned geographic sector). Data is as of 2004.

• Islamic Resistance Forces Hezbollah of Lebanon — General Staff — Brigade (3-4 battalions) for the period of military operations — Battalion — Company and Platoon

The governing bodies are the 12-member Supreme Advisory Council ( Majlis ash — Shura ), the Executive Council, and the 15-member Politburo. The Secretary-General is Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah. The Supreme Council oversees the committees on religion, finance, social affairs, politics, ideology, information, and military affairs. The military command bodies are Sections 3 and 4 of the Politburo (responsible for armed forces and intelligence, respectively).

The Armed Forces’ structure includes up to 300 instructors and advisors—Iranian citizens (primarily IRGC military personnel; the group’s coordinator is former Iranian Interior Minister Mohtashami). The Armed Forces’ organizational structure consists of separate infantry/motorized battalions with a staff of 252 personnel (which can be consolidated into brigades if necessary). The battalions are effectively an administrative structure; combat operations are carried out by temporary task forces.

• Armed forces of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam — Headquarters — Region (7) — Sector — Detachment
• Eritrean Liberation Army of the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front — General Headquarters — Front — Brigade — Detachment
• Kurdistan Liberation Army of the Kurlistan Workers’ Party — General Staff — Military District, Obtan (8) — Brigade (2-3 in the district) — Company and Platoon
• Sahrawi National Liberation Army of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Sakiet al-Hamra and Rio del Oro (POLISARIO) of Western Sahara — General Headquarters — Military District or Zone (7) — Regiment in the district — Battalion (4-5 in the regiment) — Company

Organization – seven military districts/zones (Nos. 1–7; according to unconfirmed reports, one district has been disbanded). Each zone includes one regiment consisting of 4–5 combat battalions, separate tank platoons, and artillery units. The 2nd military zone (Tifariti region) includes: two mechanized battalions (330 men each); one motorized battalion (200 men); one artillery division; support battalion; logistic battalion (330 men); training school. 

1. The Malaya Peoples’ Liberation Army of the Communist Party of Malaysia — General Headquarters — Front — Operational Area — Battalion in the Area — Detachment
2. Home Army of Poland – General Staff – Region (Obshchar, 3-4) – Military District (2-4 in the region) – Brigade (3-5 in the district) – Battalion and then Company
3. Lithuanian Liberation Army – General Headquarters – Partisan District (Districts) – Headquarters – County – Battalion – Company
4. Ukrainian Insurgent Army of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists – General Headquarters – region (actually 3) – regional headquarters – district (2-5) – battalion (kuren) and then a hundred
5. Free Aceh Movement — General Headquarters — Regional Command (6) — Sector — Battalion

The organizational structure of the Armed Forces consists of six regional commands (Pidi, West Aceh, East Aceh-Pureulak, South Aceh, North Aceh, and Banda Aceh). The commands are divided into designated sectors (areas of responsibility), each of which operates one «battalion.»

1. Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces — General Headquarters — Regional Command — Division — Sector — Brigade — Battalion

The highest governing bodies are the Council ( Majlis ash — Shura ) consisting of 60 people, the Central Committee of 28 people. The chairman of the MILF is Ustaz Hashim Salamat. The leadership consists of Muhammad al-Haj Murad Ibrahim (deputy chairman for military affairs), Gadzali Jaafar (deputy chairman for political affairs), Ustaz Abubhali Yahya (deputy chairman for ideology), Ustaz Sharif Julabbi, Muhaker Iqbal, Ustaz Alem Abdulaziz Mimbantas (curator of the internal affairs and security line), Aid Kabalu (curator of the PR line ). The number of the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces / BIAF at the beginning 2002 г. — 12,500 — 15,000 people. Identified formations — 2nd, 3rd «division», 206th, 303rd, 308th «brigades». The MILF also includes a special forces group, support structures, including a security service and a military Sharia court.

1. Armed Forces of the Islamic Emirate of the Caucasus — General Headquarters — Front (9) — Sector (34) — Detachment — Special Operations Group,
2. Armed Forces of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan — Supreme Shura in Quetta (Pakistan) or Quetta Shura — front (3) — front Shura — front headquarters — unit in the province — detachment in the district,
3. United Tajik Opposition – United Shura – front (5) – detachment-group.

During the period of active hostilities in 1992-93, the Armed Forces were organized as part of operational groups/fronts: Panj (over 3,000 people); Shaartuz-Kabodiyen (up to 1,000), Kulyab (3,000), Badakhshan (4,000), Garm (3,000).

It is also necessary to understand that at the provincial level, the judicial (court of appeal, chief judge), political (political administration, commissioner), executive (head of the region, wali, chairman of the provincial revolutionary committee) and religious authority of the rebels (mufti) are combined.

         Front characteristics: name, area of responsibility, command structure, number of «active bayonets,» structure of front units, characteristics of senior leadership, weapons, communications, attitudes of the local population, presence of bases. The levels of Central Command, Regional Command (Front), Brigade (Battalion) in a sector, and Detachment are evident, although there are many variations.

A reconnaissance and sabotage group consists of a commander, a signalman, a sapper, a medic, and a sniper. A partisan platoon consists of 12 men, a 6-man squad, a commander, and a deputy commander. A partisan detachment consists of 5-7 platoons, a column, a brigade of 5-7 detachments, and a corps or front of 2-4 columns. A partisan platoon consists of a commander, a sapper, a grenade launcher, a sniper, and 2 machine gunners. A brigade includes a company for logistics, communications, a hospital, heavy weapons, and sabotage.

4. URBAN REBELLION FORCES INFRASTRUCTURE

Let us separately touch upon the issue of the structure of the organization of rebels in the context of urban guerrilla warfare.

The classic organization of this type is the Irish Republican Army – Provisional. The IRA is the unofficial armed wing of the Irish party Sinn Fein (translated as «We Ourselves»). The highest body is the General Military Convention, which meets every two years. Administrative functions are performed by the Military Executive Committee, which meets at least once every six months. The permanent leadership body is the Military Council (consisting of 7 people), which operates illegally. The Council permanently includes: the Commander-in-Chief of Personnel, the Adjutant General, and the Quartermaster General. Operations are directed by the General Staff. The strength of the IRA as of 1997 г. – 200–400 operative militants (all awarded military ranks). The permanent composition is no more than 50 people.

Following a reorganization of the IRA’s organizational structure in the 1970s and the abandonment of large formations (brigade and battalion), militants operate in autonomous cells. The current organization consists of the Northern General Command (100 men in Belfast, 70-80 men in Derry), the Southern General Command (covering 21 counties in Ireland, including the Northern, Southern, Western, and Dublin «brigades»), and the British Department. In Belfast alone, there are 13 IRA structural groups.

Each command has its own commander, operations coordinator, and quartermaster. The active unit is divided into cells, known as Active Specialist Groups, each typically consisting of five to eight members, sometimes more. For special situations, special operations groups are assembled. The main logistics and training facilities are located in Ireland.

Another example is the Basque Fatherland and Freedom, or the Basque group ETA. It is the armed arm of the Basque National Party (which achieves up to 10% of popular support in the elections of the autonomous Basque Country in Spain). The organizational structure is built on the classic model of an urban guerrilla group; it includes autonomous underground cells; Donosti commando strike groups ; and support groups (Y-groups). The identified structures are the regional commands of Viscaya, San Sebastian, Madrid, and Barcelona; the Nafarroa (Pamplona), Iparretarrak (France), and Iraultza groups.

We will also touch upon the Red Brigades – the Combat Communist Party. Formed in 1969 in Italy. The peak of influence and activity was in the 1970s. Organizational structure as of the mid-1970s – Strategic Command ( Direkzione) Srategico ), Executive Command ( Direkzione Executiva ); intelligence, information, psychological operations services; regional columns (cities of Rome, Milan, Turin, Genoa, Venice, Naples).

5. POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF RESISTANCE.

The goals of the irreconcilable opposition structures:

1. Paramilitary formations — tension, partial loss of control by the official government.
2. Terrorists — to intimidate potential supporters of the official government.
3. Military movement — victory on a national scale.
4. The political party is the majority in the legal structures of state governance.
5. A front is a leading bloc of forces controlled by the party, capable of mobilizing society to achieve the goals of the rebels.
6. Civil Administration is the state authority in rebel-controlled areas.

The rebel state is headed by the Provisional Government of National Unity. Committees, such as information, social affairs, agriculture, and others, are formed to coordinate the work of government ministries and departments. A pre-parliament, composed of representatives of the main parties supporting the rebel war, oversees the work. The government typically establishes an international commission for negotiations with the official government. The Defense Council or State Defense Committee is responsible for strategic political planning of military operations.

In the case of a weak rebel state machine, this task is performed by the Military Committee of the National Rebel Front or the Military Commission, although the committee is primarily concerned with political planning, while the commission is more concerned with organizational matters (for example, the assignment of ranks). Military committees have been established in the Armed Forces of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria, the New People’s Army of the Communist Party of the Philippines, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, and the Politburo of Hezbollah in Lebanon. The Supreme Political Court serves as the highest party authority. At the grassroots level, revolutionary tribunals or Sharia courts (among Islamists) are established.

Accordingly, within the state, either a Supreme Revolutionary Tribunal under the Central Command, a Supreme Sharia Court, or a tribunal comprising a military field collegium is established. In the Islamic Emirate of the Caucasus, a Military Field Collegium of the Supreme Sharia Court operates, appointed by the Emirate’s emir. According to internal Emirate documents, this is required to be done upon the recommendation of the Court Committee and the fatwa of the Majlis al-Shura, but is generally ignored, as this committee may not be operational among the militants. At the regional level—the wilayats—of the Emirate, the emir appoints chief Sharia judges, who, along with the walis (heads) of the wilayats and front commanders, exercise the authority of the Emirate.

The tasks of the rebel civil administration:

1. Substitution of the government’s civilian administration at every possible level. The main goal is to seize control of the immediate grassroots social life of society in each specific locality.
2. Demonstration of government inefficiency at every possible level of governance, ranging from sabotage to subversion.
3. Achieving government management efficiency through the creation of total control structures.
4. Real control of territory for international recognition is the main thing: to capture a large, significant region that is at the same time difficult for official government troops to access; at the very least, to capture the capital, at least temporarily.

The characteristics of a rebel quasi-state are as follows: the parliament is formed based on the party representation of the main political forces, the executive apparatus of the rebel government is not yet fully organized, constitutional justice in such conditions is usually absent, the judicial system is represented by grassroots revolutionary courts, the highest judicial body is absent or unstable, the province is headed by a committee with a bureau apparatus, the GPNU forms a temporary diplomatic commission for negotiations with the official government, a Defense Council is created under the GPNU to manage the military sphere, and representative offices are established in friendly countries.

The government structure, for example, in the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front, included the departments of education, social assistance, health, agriculture, and internal affairs. The Mozambique People’s Liberation Front had the following departments in its secretariat: administration, finance, foreign affairs, agitation and propaganda, social affairs, education, and health.

In the case of the military-political-state version of the Resistance, the main structure of the rebels is the front, usually Islamic, national, or communist. At the head of the front is the Executive Committee or Political Bureau (Shura in Islamists). The Executive Committee is usually backed up by the creation of a shadow committee in case of failure. The expanded composition of the Executive Committee is the Central Committee (Majlis al-Shura in Islamists). The Historical Leadership Council signifies the continuity of the struggle and carries prestige. The congress of the national front is often formal, although very important.

The province is headed by a Provincial Revolutionary Committee (Revkom or Obkom), headed by an executive committee and territorial ministries (among Islamists, a Provincial Islamic Revolutionary Committee). Very often, all committees at all levels are called Committees for the Defense of the Revolution. In the Islamic Emirate of the Caucasus, the province (wilayat) is headed by a wali appointed by the Emirate’s emir. This appointment must be made with the consent of the Majlis ul-Shura, but is usually ignored.

         Political headquarters: party leadership, think tank, central command headquarters, government, general staff, communications center.

Typically, the Resistance develops an umbrella structure of political coordinating power, encompassing all opposition groups. This umbrella structure is formed by the Committee of the Rebel State, which acts as the pre-parliament of the rebel state and holds congresses to formulate common policy. The core of the umbrella structure must necessarily be the most organized, ideologically motivated, and militant entity, most often a party.

For example,

1. the separatist Movement of the Struggle for Freedom of Lithuania of the independent Republic of Lithuania,
2. Islamist Moro Islamic Liberation Front of the Bangsamoro Islamic State,
3. Islamist Movement for the Decolonization of the Caucasus of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria,
4. separatist Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army,
5. Communist Coordinating Committee of the Simon Bolivar Guerrilla Movement of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia,
6. communist National Democratic Front of the New People’s Army of the Philippines,
7. separatist Karen National Democratic Front (Myanmar),
8. Left-wing allied Revolutionary Democratic Front of the Communist Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (El Salvador),

Zones controlled by the Resistance are called «liberated» or «liberated areas.» This is a political unit, as opposed to a military one. A «base area» is a military unit. A single liberated zone may have several base areas. A «base area» is the location of large resistance forces. A liberated area is a province where the rebels exercise authority, while a base area is typically a fortified area in difficult terrain, well-equipped with engineering resources. Simply put, a liberated area is a political unit of a rebel state, while a base area is a military unit of the rebel army.

         For a decisive rebel offensive on the capital, several large zones and key base areas must be liberated; otherwise, even if only one or two such zones are present, they risk defeat. A liberated zone can only be defined as an area where rebels maintain stable control, even with a large government troop presence. This refers specifically to political control over the population.

Conditions for the success of the Resistance in the long term: the presence of a significant ideology, the ideology can be very powerful, as a rule, nationalism, communism or Islamism or a mixture, the weakness of the state apparatus and the security forces of the counter-insurgency side, the absence of a strong, suppressive state machine throughout the area of state control, favorable geopolitical conditions, that is, mountainous terrain, for example, and a border with friendly states that provide significant support, external support sometimes plays a decisive role, as, for example, in the case of the Kosovo Liberation Army, the optimal military-political organization of the rebels allows for large-scale operations and the rapid mobilization of reserves.

         The rebels need a large and significant liberated area that they can hold for a long time. Then they can declare the creation of a trench government and proclaim a state. This will then trigger a chain reaction of uprisings in other parts of the country. Ideally, this region should be a large city and its surrounding area. Such actions are usually accompanied by a diversionary wave of terrorism.